The Threat of Mortar Attack

‘The introduction of the new weapon into the CTO inventory has potentially grave effects for Butterworth’ (Nov 75).

While the Department of Defence’s Nature of Service Branch (NOSB) in its “Background Paper Parliamentary Petition, Dated 3 March 2014, Rifle Company Butterworth 1970-1989” acknowledged there was a possible threat to Butterworth from communist acquired mortars, they fail to expand on the threat. Why?

To quote the NOSB report, starting at paragraph 36:

36.     In 1975 while OC RAAF Base Butterworth believed there is little threat to the Base. DAFI Report No 33 on security at Butterworth in July 1975 notes that:

The possibility of the CT possessing operational mortars adds to the threat against Air Base Butterworth. However, it is most likely that warning of an impending attack would be received prior to the attack taking place. (Cited DAFI Minute INT 8/10/3 Security Situation – Air Base Butterworth Report 33 dated 3 July 1975)

37.     DAFI also saw a threat from indirect weapons such as 81/82mm mortars as expressed in DAFI Report No. 34. (Referenced - SRGD-AF Minute 564/8/28(73) dated 16 July 1975 to DGOR-AF)

38.     On 23 July 1975 the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) advised it could not confirm the CTs had mortars without further substantial evidence, although the advice did discuss the likely challenges faced by a defending force if it was to seek to prevent their use. (Referenced – JIO JSI/85 Security – Butterworth Air Base dated 23 July 1975, to DAFI)

39.     DAFI considered that as a result of increased use of the base by RMAF for airstrikes against CT targets, the base faced a greater chance of becoming a target:

Continued use of the Butterworth as a base for ground-attack against the CT can only increase its attractiveness as a target … From this point of view, the threat to the Air Base Butterworth must be considered to be slowly increasing. (Cited DAFI Minute INT 8/10/3 (150) Security Situation – Air Base Butterworth Report 34 dated 4 August 1975)

 Copies of the four documents referenced above by NOSB are in the possession of the author. These documents, along with others referenced by NOSB, acknowledge the presence of a threat to Butterworth, including the fact it was used by the Malaysians as a ‘base for ground-attack against the CT …’ As demonstrated in other posts, because the threat of attack from an armed enemy known to be active in the region could not be ruled out, Australian service personnel at Butterworth – and, in fact, Peninsular Malaysia – incurred danger from the  hostile forces of an enemy and should therefore receive full repatriation benefits.

As with other sections of NOSB’s report, key evidence is omitted in what can only be seen as an attempt to downplay the threat.

  

DAFI Minute INT 8/10/3 Security Situation – Air Base Butterworth Report 33 dated 3 July 1975

 Quoted in the NOSB report at para. 36 (above).

NOSB quotes para. 9 of this report. Rather than saying ‘…it is most likely that warning of an impending attack would be received prior to the attack taking place’ the document states ‘…it is most unlikely that warning of an impending attack would be received prior to the attack taking place’.

First, the possibility of an attack, whether or not prior warning was received, does not negate the fact that personnel at Butterworth Base ‘incurred danger from the hostile forces of an enemy’. The omission of ‘un’ could have been a ‘typo’. However, a deliberate omission would be consistent with other attempts by NOSB to downplay the risk to Butterworth throughout their report by quoting out of context or ignoring key evidence showing the real state of affairs at the time.

(Document accessed at 564/8/28(174))

Comparison of para. 9 in the original (top) and the NOSB 'quote'

  

  SRGD-AF Minute 564/8/28(73) dated 16 July 1975 to DGOR-AF

Quoted in the NOSB report at para. 37 (above).

This minute acknowledges the OC [Officer Commanding] Butterworth’s belief that there was little threat to the Base (see NOSB para. 36, above). It explains the OC considered any external threat would be posed by rockets similar to those used in other attacks in the country. These had limited range and would expose the firer to villagers friendly to the RAAF in surrounding villages. In para. 3 the author, Wing Commander J.I. Brough, SRGD-AF, reports that the OC’s view was not shared by DAFI:

However, there is some disagreement between this view and that of DAFI, who believes that the CT have 81 or 82 mm mortars (range approx. 3000m) available to them. If this is true in puts an entirely different viewpoint on the matter, and we may have to consider additional security measures, for example, revetments and off-base patrolling by the infantry company.

The Wing Commander added that he thought ‘it prudent to agree to a review of the threat’. Having acknowledged the document, why didn’t NOSB explain the threat.

(Document repositioned to folio 178)

JIO JSI/85 Security – Butterworth Air Base dated 23 July 1975, to DAFI

 Quoted in the NOSB report at para. 38 (above).

The report explained that mortars had greater range than rockets, were more destructive and were much more difficult to defend against:

… A rough rule of thumb is that an infantry battalion deployed in a defensive position can hold a front of 1000 metres in close country and 2000 metres in open country. The attached map shows that at a distance of 3000 metres from the base, a perimeter is formed of 16,000 metres. While it is not suggested that armies will every have enough troops to man such a perimeter, the vulnerability of such an installation to insurgent mortar attacks is readily apparent. The problem posed by mortars is much greater that that posed by 3.5 inch rockets, on the bases of range, destructive power and accuracy.

The author informed that further information on CTO weapons acquisition would be forwarded as it came to hand.

Further documents available to NOSB reveal on-going, escalating concern with the mortar threat.

On 7 October 1975 the Chief of Air Staff (CAS), Air Vice Marshall J.A. Rowland, wrote to the Minister informing of current security concerns and making recommendations for an upcoming meeting of the Minister with the Malaysian Prime Minister. There was increased concern over the security of areas surrounding the Base owing to recent intelligence reports indicating the possibility of communist intentions to launch rocket attacks on bases in Malaysia. He reiterated the concern at the possibility of the CT possessing mortars and expressed the view that a minimum of two infantry battalions were required to provide an effective deterrent against rocket and mortar attacks on the Base. He also acknowledged that ‘Even at this level … security of the area at night must remain doubtful’. Among the recommendations was a request to Malaysia for the allocation of ‘at least one battalion to the area immediately surrounding Butterworth for area defence’. (Security of Butterworth, from J.A. Rowland, CAS, 564/8/28(290).

On 14 October, the Deputy Chief of Air Staff, AVM N.P. McNamara, wrote to DJS as a follow-up to the communication between the CAS and Minister on the 7th. He advised of continued concern over the lack of Malaysian army units around Butterworth while at the same time acknowledging the presence of such could not remove the possibility of an attack.

We also recognise that as Armies and Air Forces have different primary roles, the Air Force commander responsible for the ground defence and security of an Air Base, can never be guaranteed the continuance of Army presence if other priorities influence the local Army Commander. Therefore, at Butterworth, if the allocation of even one battalion were arranged, its tenure of occupancy in a defensive posture is unlikely to be unconditionally assured. In any case, determined DTs would have only limited difficulty in infiltrating onto the airfield or to within 3.5 inch rocket or 81/82mm mortar range. At best, an infantry battalion represents a deterrent presence.

Given the continued vulnerability of the Base to attack, regardless of the outcome of the upcoming meeting with the Malaysian Prime Minister, the DCAS advised the ‘requirement for blast protection of aircraft against ground burst weapons and small arms fire together with aircraft dispersal is currently under review. (Security of Butterworth, N.P. McNamarra, DCAS, 564/8/28(293).

(JSI Document sourced at 568/8/28(233))

 DAFI Minute INT 8/10/3 (150) Security Situation – Air Base Butterworth Report 34 dated 4 August 1975

Quoted in the NOSB report at para. 39 (above).

The minute reported that air strikes were carried out from Butterworth on July 25th and 26th. It also informed of a recent report indicating ‘that the security arrangements at the Base are less than adequate.’  Para.s 6 and 7 state:

… No posts are permanently manned by security forces in the area immediately surrounding Butterworth. Two observation towers which have been built on the eastern boundary are still waiting for the installation of seachlights, and are not manned. External patrolling of the Air Base only takes place if a VIP is visiting, or a positive threat exists.

Local authorities have stated that no Malaysian Security Force contingency plan exists for the reinforcement of Air Base Butterworth. It is not known if such a plan exists at the Ministry of Defence. A locally known plan, which has been implemented once in 1975, allows for the deployment of troops from HQ 6MIB are fairly heavily committed on the Thai/Malaysian border and the size of the force that could be sent to Butterworth depends largely on this commitment. The nearest artillery units to Butterworth are at Taiping.

Of note is the fact that a local contingency plan for the reinforcement of Butterworth was implemented once in 1975 – although no further details are provided.

This advice was included in the above advice to the Minister by the CAS.

An earlier document, ‘Annex A to HQBUT 5/1/AIR (72), dated 11 July 1975, Security – Air Base Butterworth’ confirmed ‘Isolated CT incidents and consequent Security Forces follow-up operations adjacent to Air Base Butterworth have been reported in HQ RAAF Butterworth Intelligence Reports to DAFI’ (included in 564/8/28(230).

(Security Report 34 sourced at 564/8/28(184))

Capture of Unidentified CTO Weapon

 Wing Commander R.A. Brazier, SRGD, in a minute to DGOR-AF dated 21 Nov 75, advised of the recent capture of two yet-to-be identified weapons. He attached ‘a photograph obtained from discreet sources …’ and stated that the fact both weapons were captured in the one engagement indicated the number of weapons was ‘not limited’. He then spelled out what he saw as potential implications for Butterworth:

The introduction of the new weapon into the CTO inventory has potentially grave effects for Butterworth. 3.5” rockets previously used in attacks around BUT have a potential range of 700 metres, but so far have not been used over 400 metres. Weapons which appear to be similar to that capture on 3 Sep, have ranges up to 6,000 m. More importantly, there is now firm evidence that new weapons are being acquired. (564/8/28(309).

According to a hand-written note on the page, the weapons were capture in N.E. Perak, approximately 60 km from Butterworth. A further hand-written comment, dated 12 Jan 76 and signed by the SRGD, noted unconfirmed intelligence indicated the weapon was a mortar manufactured in a ‘backyard foundry in N. Vietnam’ and that this assessment was waiting for confirmation.

Captured CTO Weapon

 

Revetments Constructed at Butterworth

 In response to the perceived threat of rocket and mortar attack revetments were constructed to limit the damage of an attack on the Mirage flight lines. While the date of construction has not been verified, anecdotal evidence suggest it may have been as early as January 1976. If this is the fact, they were built within two to three months of the DCAS advised the DJS they were under consideration.

That they were constructed within 12 months of the matter being raised by the DCAS in response to mortar and rocket attacks is confirmed by the draft AUSTEO document ‘The RAAF Presence at Butterworth’, attached to the Department of Defence Minute, ‘Review of Butterworth Deployment’, written by R.N. Hamilton, A/First Assistant Secretary, Strategic & International Policy Division, dated 22 October 1976 (Reference: DEF 270/1/4, included in 696/6/4/6 PART 3 (282). Paragraphs 20 and 21 are copied below:

20. The likelihood of a terrorist attack endangering the RAAF deployment in the immediate future is presently assessed to be low. It would probably – but not necessarily – be associated with a significant escalation of CPM activity. This is presently assessed as unlikely. It would probably not occur without warning.

21. If such an attack did occur, however, its implications would be serious. Its most likely form would be an attack of short duration on the base using indirect fire from light mortars of small rockets. There is also the possibility of discriminate of indiscriminate acts of terrorism in the Butterworth or Penang areas generally. In either case Australian personnel – including dependants – and equipment would be endangered. Action has recently been taken to construct revetments to give some protection to the Australian aircraft at Butterworth against attack. The need for improved security on and off the base has also been recognised.

  

Conclusion

 Evidence omitted by NOSB demonstrates that senior Defence and Government officials held serious concerns over what they saw as an escalating security threat to Butterworth that resulted in the construction of revetments to protect the Mirage fleet from possible rocket and mortar attacks. That this evidence was ignored by NOSB in what can only be seen as an attempt to hide the real threat to Butterworth must call in to question their impartiality and objectivity on the matter.

Sources

National Australian Archives:

• NAA: 568/8/28 PART 8, RAAF Butterworth – Ground defence plans

• NAA: 696/6/4/5 PART 3, Butterworth Base - General

A Competent, Well Trained and Methodical Enemy

A 1973 report prepared by the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency describes a careful and methodical re-establishment of a very competent communist guerrilla force in North West Malaysia.

By mid-1968, some 600 armed Communist insurgents … began to move gradually from inactive to active status under stimulation from Peking. They moved back across the border [from Thailand], first to reconnoitre and then permanently to position themselves in small base areas in northern West Malaysia. The CTs - - that is, Communist Terrorists or members of the MNLA [Malayan National Liberation Army] – numbered about 600 regular armed cadres at the close of the Emergency (1948-1960), expanded to about 1,000 by 1968, to about 1,600 in mid-1970, and to about 1,800 in mid-1972. The slow upward progression in the number of armed insurgents represents a positive gain, and the existence of small bases capable of accommodating about 40-60 CTs points toward a long-term potential expansion.’ …

The Peking-inspired revival of the armed insurgency can be fixed to the date of 17 June 1968 when a force of the MNLA for the first time since the late 1950s attacked a Malaysian security force unit on Malaysian territory. This well-trained Communist force numbered about 40 armed and uniformed men, and their ambush was effectively carried out. The evidence is that the revival of the insurgency in mid-1968 reflected from the start considerable military competence: good planning, tactical caution, good execution. CT units were armed and given uniforms in Southern Thailand and were infiltrated skilfully into Malaysian territory with the initial mission of reconnoitring and re-establishing contacts with underground insurgents. Their mission later became that of making selective attacks on Malaysian security force units and undertaking selective sabotage of key installations in West Malaysia. Toward the end of 1968, the number of NMLA – or CT – incursions from southern Thailand gradually increased. In late 1970, it was solidly confirmed that small groups of CT infiltrators had permanently established small bases for inside-Malaysia operations – a development occurring for the first time since the late 1950s. Later, the base camps were reported to be capable of supporting 40-60 CTs, as they included food caches.

The CTs were still building their units and were not in a phase of general offensive operations. But they did engage in selective strikes against government forces. A major incident involving the mining by CT forces of the main west coast road linking Malaysia and Thailand took place in late October 1969. On 10 December, a strategic installation was hit: a group of CTs blew up the 100-foot-long railway bridge on Malaysian territory about two miles southwest of Padang Besar, Perlis Province, severing for a few days the main railway link between Thailand and Malaysia. Gradually the CTs increased the number of cross-border incursions, their calculation having been to demonstrate their ability to operate on Malaysian territory without suffering extensive combat losses. They wanted to test their own ability to safely infiltrate, to hit important installations and roads, and to move bigger units across undetected. Their planning was careful, the pace deliberate, and the actions generally low risk.

Source:

Directorate of Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency, USA (CIA)), Intelligence Report: Peking’s Support of Insurgencies In Southeast Asia (Reference Title: POLO LIII), April 1973, p.p. 115 - 118 at http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-37.pdf, accessed 12 Sep 2012

Malaysia's Multiple Emergencies

Dr Rizal Yaakop, Senior Lecturer at School for History, Politics and Strategic Studies, University Kebangsaan, in his article ‘The Emergency Law in Malaysia’, discusses emergency regulation in Malaysia. In all, five emergencies have been declared in the country, the first being the declaration of Emergency in 1948 by the British in response to the communist uprising.

The other four were declared post-independence, the first being in 1963 in response to the Indonesian Confrontation. At the date of Dr. Yaakop’s article (October 2010), this and subsequent declarations had not been revoked. Two declarations, one in 1966 and the other in 1977, applied to single states. The fourth was proclaimed after an outbreak of ethnic violence in May 1969. According to Dr Yaakop, only two of these ‘were justified by the grave emergency conditions of the time’, those of 1963 and 1969.

Bedlington wrote in 1978: ‘In mid-1975 the government promulgated a set of Essential Regulations that, without declaring a state of emergency, gave sweeping powers to the authorities, including the abrogation in some cases of the rules of evidence.’ (p.181)

The year before, Richard Stubbs presented five factors he believed provided ‘increasing evidence that the Government will prevail.’ The first of these were the security measures the Government was taking to counter the communists:

… First, it has gradually reintroduced counter-guerrilla measures that proved effective during the Emergency years. Propaganda offensives have been mounted and the State Psychological Warfare Committees have been active. Substantial cash rewards also have been offered for information leading to the arrest of communist guerrillas. In rural areas a force reminiscent of the Home Guard which operated so well during the Emergency has been constituted. Under the Rukun Tetangga (principle of neighbourhood) every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five must register for duty. In those areas where guerrillas are thought to be operating, short-term curfews have been imposed and food-denial programmes implemented, which, as Richard Clutterbuck has recorded, were particularly successful during the latter stages of the Emergency. And, under the Essential (Community Self-Reliance) Regulations, 1975, security laws have been tightened and special courts set up to try suspected terrorists. These measures, in conjunction with the expansion of the Police Force, indicate the determination of the Government to maintain order and contain the communist threat ... (p.259)

Australia’s Nature of Service Branch of the Department of Defence deny this important part of Malaysian history in their “Background Paper Parliamentary Petition Dated 3 March 2014 Rifle Company Butterworth 1970-1989”. At paragraph 81 they cite a letter from the Army History Unit to Mr Robert Cross of 11 Feb 2004:

No state of ‘war’ or emergency has existed in the Federated States of Malaysia since the establishment of the need in 1970 to deploy a rifle company at BUTTERWORTH. Professor David Horner at the Australian National University agrees that no military threat against the national interests of Malaysia has emerged since the cessation of hostilities with Indonesia (since Confrontation ended in 11 Aug 66).

This denial of Malaysian history is also denial of true history of Butterworth and that of those who served there.

References:

Mohd Rizal Yaakop, ‘The Emergency Law in Malaysia – Political Security of Liability?’, University Kebangsaan, Malaysia, 21 October 2010. Accessed at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1695727, 15 Mar 2015

Richard Stubbs, ‘Peninsular Malaysia: The “New Emergency”’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Summer, 1977), University of British Columbia, p.249.

Stanley S. Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore; ‘The Building of New States’, Cornell University Press, London, 1978.